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11-17-25 carib
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11-17-25 spal
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11-17-25 panasonic
| Vic, at this point to me all news are fake, till something really happens. |
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11-17-25 victor
pana, dt said they are having talks with nm
https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/11/17/venezuela/sheinbaum-dialogo-trump-maduro-orix
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11-17-25 panasonic
Vic, my read from interview is different:
"Iran nuclear sites left ruined in US and Israeli strikes but program ‘intact,’ deputy foreign minister tells CNN"
"Program" is intact, whatever that means. |
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11-17-25 savo
| I imagine after the initial shock.. this will be good for the bonds... less constitutional uncertainty. |
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11-17-25 savo
Ecuadorians returned to the polls this Sunday for the third national vote this year, this time to decide on a new referendum and popular consultation. All four questions on the ballot were rejected, including the centerpiece proposal to convene a constituent assembly to amend the 2008 Constitution (originally reformed under former President Rafael Correa). The proposal was rejected by 61.5% of votes (with 85% counted), representing a notable setback for the Noboa administration, which had positioned constitutional reform as a key pillar in its strategy to fight against crime. Notably, the referendum vote coincided with the arrest in Spain of the top leader of Los Lobos, Ecuador’s most violent criminal organization.
The remaining three questions—permitting the establishment of foreign military bases to address organized crime, eliminating the state’s obligation to fund political organizations, and reducing the number of Assembly members—were similarly rejected by a majority of voters (Figure 1). Voter participation exceeded 80%, above the historical average of 78% observed across the past nine referendums.
The outcome was surprising, given that recent polling generally favored approval (“Yes” vote) on most questions. The rejection occurred despite heightened public concern over insecurity and crime, which had been the main focus of the referendum. Additionally, President Noboa’s approval rating remains above 50% and has shown signs of recovery, historically a strong predictor of referendum success. However, this historical correlation did not hold. In our view, the lack of clarity surrounding the government’s constitutional reform proposals, coupled with concerns that social rights enshrined in the 2008 constitution could be reversed, contributed to the adverse result. |
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11-17-25 victor
| El viceministro de Asuntos Exteriores de Irán, Saeed Khatibzadeh, declaró a Fred Pleitgen de CNN que el “programa nuclear pacífico” de Irán permanece intacto y no fue destruido por los ataques estadounidenses e israelíes contra sus instalaciones. |
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11-17-25 pillz
Environment analysis | The irreversible deployment of Trump
Sun Nov 16 07:24:37 2025 EDT
The buildup of U.S. military forces off the coast of Venezuela undoubtedly places us in the environment of the so-called "Day Zero" of the transition strategy. The situation has escalated beyond a mere exercise of coercion and must be analyzed as a sequential game in which the cost of inaction for the United States, particularly for President Trump, is now significantly higher than the cost of any decisive military action (attack, incursion or invasion).
The U.S. administration has entered a phase of no return, driven by the strategic logic of deterrence, a reputation for engagement, and domestic political imperatives. With the presence in the Caribbean of the USS Gerald R Ford carrier strike group (the "floating fortress of US power" X, MarineTraffic), along with other units representing one of the largest deployments since 2003.
If the stated objective was only to fight drug trafficking ("Southern Spear"), the deployment of the world's largest and most advanced aircraft carrier is not the right tool, as it is optimized to attack adversaries on land or sea. This imbalance between the means and the end suggests that the true utility of force is coercion for regime change and sustained permanence of the new government.
If the Trump administration were to withdraw such a massive force without achieving political change or meaningful military action, this would constitute a political and diplomatic defeat and make the administration look "ridiculous." From Washington's perspective, the cost of withdrawing the naval force and validating that its escalation was a bluff, bluff, or bluster is difficult to bear at this point.
Although military action involves risks, the conventional superiority of the U.S. over Venezuela is indisputable. Moreover, President Trump's domestic political elements (the need to get a "big win" before the election) act as a powerful incentive for action.
According to Game Theory, the current "Nash Equilibrium", in which both players choose their best response, points to US offensive action being its best response to the Venezuelan regime's internal defection and the only way to avoid a reputational defeat. If the Southern Command has this powerful military asset (the Ford), it must use it or withdraw.
Because it should not be forgotten that the objective of the US government is the elimination of the "unusual and extraordinary threat" that Chavismo has represented for them, as stated in the Executive Orders, originally issued by Obama, and renewed every year by every US president. Well... everything indicates that now Trump has decided to eliminate that threat.
This goes far beyond the mere decapitation of the Cartel of the Suns or the removal of one or two officials. The problem lies in the symbiosis between the Chavista leadership, the Cartel of the Suns and the state apparatus, which has led to militarization and systemic corruption.
The Venezuelan military doctrine is politically aligned with Chavismo, and they define themselves in the reveille every morning, as "Chavistas, anti-imperialists and Bolivarians", with phrases such as "homeland, socialism or death", which reflects either the motto adopted by the armed forces under the Chavez government, or a response centered on words as part of a slogan that groups their political and military identity.
To understand in depth the concept they manifest, but which not necessarily all members of the force share, it must be said that "chavistas" refers to followers of Hugo Chávez's Bolivarian socialism and his political project. "Anti-imperialists" denotes a political stance against the United States; and "Bolivarians" alludes to the leftist version that appropriated the name of Simón Bolívar, and which became an ideology that distorts everything we learned from the life and ideas of the Liberator... Most of these are real phrases taken out of context, or malicious and distorted interpretations of the original thought of one of the most important military heroes of humanity.
And finally, "fatherland, socialism or death", a phrase adopted as official salute in the Venezuelan Army in 2007, represents a declaration of loyalty to the political project. It reflects the ideology of the movement, which associates loyalty to the country ("Patria") with the socialist project, and the defense of these principles to the last consequences ("o muerte"), similar to the Cuban motto of Fidel Castro. And sometimes they spiced the expression with the "guevarismo" "hasta la victoria siempre" (until victory always).
The Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB), even if it mobilizes 200,000 troops (Southern Command, Nov. 2025), lacks sustained combat capacity for a large scale conflict, since a resistance capacity of only 48 to 72 hours was estimated, according to Rand simulation for confrontation between regular armies which do not include civilian resistances if any.
Furthermore, the Armed Forces -involved in 1,200+ documented cases of repression according to Foro Penal, 2025- have a very battered reputation for having been involved in businesses outside their scope, such as the electric, oil and mining sectors, and for having actively participated in the repression of the civilian population, defenseless and unarmed, which includes (and continues to do so with close to a thousand political prisoners captured, tortured, disappeared or killed) the elderly, women, children and disabled.
And they do it with a cruelty possibly induced by Hezbollah, the Cubans, the Iranian Republican Guard, the ELN, the 2nd Marquetalia and the Sinaloa Cartel, which, together with the Aragua train, may have done a mental work that transformed them into those specimens that today act in this way.
Maduro's response, by mobilizing troops and militias, aims at asymmetric warfare (making the occupation highly costly) and preventing a decapitation strike, which is predictable given the U.S. military superiority.
The current military design is aimed at suppressing internal conflicts, having neglected the hypothesis of conflict as a major war between countries. And if they did not neglect it, it is evident that the level of preparation, maintenance and operational readiness was not, and apparently is not, in conditions to face the coming tsunami. This in addition to the lack of will to fight to defend, not the Homeland, but a narco-terrorist group (as characterized by presidential decree by the Americans) that has kidnapped the Venezuelan state.
Assuming that the military component of the U.S. intervention is designed to be swift and forceful, the real task for the elected Government of Venezuela (which has 74% of the vote and 85% support for the exit of Chavismo according to the Panterra Poll, Oct. 2025) begins on "Day Zero" or immediately thereafter.
The elimination of the Chavista threat by force (the most likely scenario given the circumstances) will initiate a period of turbulence and damage control, which could last for weeks or months, until the new government of María Corina Machado and Edmundo González Urrutia consolidates. The managerial priority will not be military victory, but governance and institutional stability.
The post-Chavista military design should consider the refoundation of the Bolivarian National Armed Force (FANB), taking into account two simultaneous and essential phases:
1. Depuration and Depoliticization (The Demilitarization of the State), as the most critical first step that implies a total break with the current model of the "Cartel of the Suns" and the Cuban influence:
Dissolution and Nominal Refoundation: the current FANB would be legally dissolved and replaced by a new institution, such as the "National Armed Force of the Republic" or similar, giving rise to a constitutional restart.
Purge of the Top and Middle Management: There would be a massive purge of high-ranking officers and middle management linked to corruption, drug trafficking (cartel of the suns) and political repression. This would be based on trials by reformed civilian and military courts, with the support of international justice.
Return to the Barracks: The intervention of the military in civilian management (Ministers, governorships, PDVSA management, etc.) would be prohibited. The role of the military would be limited to national defense and law enforcement.
Reconversion and Recruitment: Take advantage of "Day Zero" to appoint a new High Command from the lower ranks (Colonels respected and recognized for their patriotism). The FANB must be redesigned as a force with anti-narcotics and anti-terrorist scope focused on border conflicts and irregular groups, which are the real conflict hypothesis.
2. Creation of the New Armed Force (The German Bundeswehr Model) that would be structured under principles equivalent to those of post WWII:
Total Civilian Subordination: command power and budget would be strictly subordinated to civilian authority (President and civilian Minister of Defense). Transparent civilian control mechanisms over procurement and military doctrine would be established.
Exclusively Defensive Doctrine: The new force would focus on the defense of sovereignty and borders, including terrorism, drug trafficking and transnational organized crime, with a doctrine that expressly prohibits internal repression of civilian protests or dissent.
Revaluation of Merit: Meritocracy would be reestablished in promotions and professional training, eliminating ideological and political control of military careers. Priority would be given to technical capacity and loyalty to the Constitution, not to the party.
Reputation Management: A strong message must be given nationally and internationally that the entrepreneurial role of the State and the FANB will not happen again. This requires a geopolitical realignment with the US, neighboring countries and NATO, replacing the previous alliance with Russia, China and Iran.
On the other hand, it should be considered whether the National Guard should continue to be an armed force or become a security force... It is a matter of specialization and positioning in the face of the new hybrid scenarios facing the Latin American region.
The new government must immediately use its political capital (74% of votes, 85% support for the exit) to manage the inevitable contradictions that will arise after the change that will occur.
Confidence Building: Game Theory suggests that rational players choose the best decision in the remaining game (back-induction). The government must ensure that its first decisions (justice, restructuring, basic services) are perceived as transparent and fair, breaking with the previous cycle of corruption.
Economic Alignment: Foreign investment (in electricity, gas, water infrastructure) will be the only possible source of development, given the state of ruin. The new administration must immediately send a market signal that the entrepreneurial state has disappeared and that legal security for the investor is total.
Strategic Communication: The new administration's message must be fresh and proactive, replacing the current aggressiveness with a new optimism. The strategy should focus on information with practical and symbolic utility to prepare the population for the high initial costs (tariffs, prices) that come with the restoration of the market economy and the elimination of misapplied subsidies.
To put in perspective and just as a benchmarking reference, I will comment on the military management of Germany and Japan after World War II which, in both cases, was total demilitarization to ensure that they could never again initiate a war like the one they unleashed against humanity.
Germany' s military issue was dominated by its division and its role in the Cold War.
Initial Demilitarization: After 1945, the Wehrmacht was disbanded and all weapons production capacity was dismantled.
Cold War Context: The escalation of the Cold War in the late 1940s and the founding of NATO in 1949 changed Allied strategy. A strong West Germany was seen as essential to help defend against the Soviet Union.
Rearmament: Despite strong internal and external resistance, both Germanys rearmed: West Germany (West Germany): Joined NATO in 1955. It created the Bundeswehr (Federal Defense Forces) under strict civilian control and limited by NATO in offensive weapons (such as nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles). Its role was strictly defensive within the Alliance structure.
East Germany (GDR): Joined the Warsaw Pact in 1956 and formed the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA), under the control of the Soviet Union.
Post-Reunification: After reunification in 1990, the Bundeswehr of unified Germany was fully integrated into NATO, with strict limits on troop deployment abroad.
Japan' s handling was more radical and permanent, grounded in its new U.S.-imposed Constitution.
The Peace Constitution (1947): The most crucial aspect is Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which formally renounces war as a means of settling international disputes and prohibits the maintenance of land, sea, and air forces with war potential
Self-Defense Forces (JSDF): However, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the need to protect itself led to the gradual creation of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). The JSDF is strictly limited to defensive missions within Japan and its territorial waters.
Japan relies on the U.S. security umbrella (Mutual Security Treaty of 1951) for its large-scale defense.
Ambiguity: For decades, Japan maintained ambiguity over whether the JSDF violated Article 9. In recent years, with increased regional tension (China and North Korea), Japan has interpreted Article 9 more flexibly, allowing for greater defense spending and logistical support operations to allies, while maintaining its primarily defensive nature
Reviewing the above cases as benchmarks for the Venezuelan case, it is possible that the German case (the creation of the Bundeswehr) is the most applicable and likely after the exit of Chavismo. Although perhaps it should be implemented in a much more radical way and focused on purification and civilian refoundation. Because the final objective would be to transform the FANB from being an armed wing of the revolution to become a professional and apolitical institution at the service of democracy.
With the criterion of a military re-foundation (post-Chavismo), the new Venezuelan constitution that will surely emerge after 26 years of generalized destruction, would probably not totally prohibit the existence of a military force, but would seek to control it strictly by the civilian power. The German model of "rearmament under strict civilian control" could be a useful precedent for its application.
Now, reviewing the scenarios we follow week by week, it must be recognized that the panorama, far from clearing up, has entered a phase of acceleration, which practically rules out the Optimistic Scenario of Democratic Transition, with Chavismo, entrenched and refusing even to discuss a dignified exit or exile, demonstrating that it only contemplates surrender under extreme coercion.
The only optimistic shortcut left is a voluntary democratic transition immediately after the first significant military attack (a bombing or surgical incursion), something that Chavismo has not shown willingness to do.
Because today's Innocuous Political Stalemate Scenario remains in force, but its nature has changed: it is no longer just inaction, but a tactical military truce. Chavismo remains in power thanks to the transitory inhibition of the US to escalate above the threshold of maritime interdiction.
This leads us to the Pessimistic Scenario of conflict or intervention as the clearest option, and which should begin to show its effects in these days, when the operations begin; which we do not know what they are, but everything indicates that they will occur.
Because it is clear that the military silence of the Task Force is not inaction, but intelligence gathering and readjustment of plans due to the different stimuli that have been added, such as Russia's declaration that its agreements do not include mutual military defense, and the incorporation of the "Petro effect" into the equation. The question remains: how much longer will the US allow this status quo to persist? The answer is: just long enough for intelligence to determine that a surgical strike will be clean and effective, or any other option on the menu they can imagine evaluating.
The two key themes that emerge from this analysis remain: a) that the political cost to the US of not acting is now greater than the cost of acting, and that the Pessimistic Scenario is the most logical and predictable route to resolution of this crisis; where an end to impunity will be the first objective, and a change of government the second.
And b) that the sub-product of cutting off the oil supply to Cuba, paves the way for the "ripe fruit" effect to make Cuba surrender without resistance -and even willingly- to the end of this campaign that starts with Venezuela, continues with Colombia, and reaches Mexico, all of them supporters of the continuity of the system that has been ruling Cuba for years... Oh... and we must not forget Spain which, also for many years, through its investments in tourism, has been a great financial support for the island.
Recommendations
For the Chavista government (on its way out): Generate a plan to demobilize the operative intelligence; not on its assets, but on the irreplaceable human capital of the State. They must issue an internal order to immediately release the specialized technical personnel (PDVSA engineers, Corpoelec, BCV technicians) from all defense or political surveillance tasks. The objective is to avoid the final escape or hostage-taking of operational intelligence and to ensure that these personnel are available and safe for thetransition. The destruction of technical knowledge is the ultimate act of sabotage; they must avoid it to mitigate their historical sentence. The same is valid to avoid rumors of vindictive sabotage in the disbandment process
For the elected government (led by Machado and Gonzalez): The recommendation focuses on activating a civilian replacement leadership for vital public services, with a "shadow" replacement leadership (Shadow Cabinet Operational), whose priority is not only calm, but preparation for the power vacuum. They must publicly appoint and train "Transition Services Coordinators" (former trusted managers of PDVSA, CANTV, Corpoelec, etc.) who are in the diaspora. These teams should be ready to take over the management of critical services within 72 hours of the departure of the de facto government, with full powers. This will send a signal of immediate technical competence to the population and to the US. The shock of the transition will be less violent if the State has a functional technical head of replacement waiting at the borderFor
honest businessmen and workers (I will not waste any more time with the leadership co-opted by Chavismo): Capitalize on the devaluation and credit crunch for reconstruction, with a "Reconstruction Dollar" (Niche Financing) strategy. The relentless devaluation, which will approach Bs. 500 to the dollar by December, should be seen as an opportunity; entrepreneurs should invest in assets that will immediately revalue with political stability (e.g., buy strategic land or depreciated installed capacity). More importantly, they should create private, tokenized microcredit funds (outside the traditional banking system) to finance the revival of their own supply chains and capitalize on the shortage of formal credit. Traditional banking is hamstrung by regulations, so reconstruction financing will be born out of mutual trust among entrepreneurs, using the dollar as the currency of faith.
Contact
Mail: [email protected]
SID(FNW42b95dff0e93eb9037f5)
dvpcoz gcat gcns gdef gpir gpol grisk gvio i1 ifosfl iharco iioil ioilgas lamz namz samz usa ven
Provided by INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE INC
**M2Z-PR-ESCS-13 |
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11-16-25 spal
Assessed potential for hybrid ops:
SOF Raids for Regime Decapitation (40-50% Confidence): Delta Force/SEAL heliborne insertions to capture Maduro or inner circle (e.g., Diosdado Cabello). Speculated via RQ-170 drones for targeting; echoes 2019 Goudreau plot.
SIGINT/Infiltration via Border Proxies (35-45% Confidence): CIA/SOCOM ops with Colombian ex-FARC dissidents or Venezuelan exiles for intel on C2 nodes/drug labs. Involves anomalous air patterns (P-8A/MQ-9) for real-time targeting. Historical: 2025 pilot flips for intel
False-Flag Infrastructure Sabotage (30-40% Confidence): Maduro self-sabotage (e.g., refineries/bridges) to blame U.S., or U.S.-backed opposition hits for pretext. Gimenez recircs warnings; aligns with Venezuelan "asymmetric chaos" vows.
Narco-Network Disruptions (35% Confidence): Covert strikes on Cartel de los Soles labs/ports via proxies (e.g., DEA-embedded locals). Framed as "Southern Spear" anti-drug, but masks regime pressure.
Overall: Chatter up 25% post-towers, but evidence thin (contextual leaks > forensics). Moderate confidence stems from EO history; full ops unlikely without Nov 18 Trump pivot.
Watch: ADS-B for stealth drone spikes.
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11-16-25 spal
| I don't think he is heading to Madison Square Gardens in any event. |
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11-16-25 savo
does this guy look like being on his way to Guantanamo?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C2C-ZvH2mqA
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11-16-25 victor
Reported to have had a little spirit bird he calls "pinky" on his shoulder at the time of this performance.
:-))
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11-16-25 panasonic
| Spal, bus driver unable to strike a deal, stupidest billionaire I've seen. |
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11-16-25 spal
3 transmission towers down (~2 AM CST); CIA alterations alleged.
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11-16-25 spal
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11-16-25 spal
Change:
Shift from ambiguous "loitering" to confirmed CSG transit—Ford now ~150nm off Aruba/Curaçao, enabling 2h strike windows vs. prior 4-6h.
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11-16-25 spal
Nicolás Maduro's November 15, 2025, rendition of John Lennon's "Imagine" at a Caracas rally—crooning anti-war lyrics like "living life in peace" amid U.S. carrier deployments—mirrors Saddam Hussein's pre-invasion psychological operations (psyops) in tone and intent: desperate, media-amplified pleas for de-escalation to humanize the leader, rally domestic support, and erode international will for conflict. Both occurred against U.S.-led buildups (Gulf Wars 1991 and 2003), using broadcasts to frame the regime as a peace-seeking victim. However, Saddam's efforts blended soft appeals with militaristic bravado, reflecting his Ba'athist propaganda machine, while Maduro's is a singular, folksy stunt in a crumbling socialist echo chamber.
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11-16-25 spal
| https://www.the-sun.com/news/15499169/venezuelan-tyrant-sings-john-lennon-imagine-to-trump/ |
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11-16-25 spal
USS Gerald R. Ford CSG officially enters Caribbean via Anegada Passage (dawn Nov 16, ~150nm off Aruba); joins Iwo Jima ARG (10k+ Marines). SOUTHCOM: "Critical step" vs. narcoterrorism, but maps target Venezuelan ports/airfields.
No vector shifts per MarineTraffic.
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11-16-25 spal
Maduro sings John Lennon's "Imagine" (video circ. 10:30 PM CST Nov 15, 100K+ views by 9 AM Nov 16), pleading "peace, no war" in English amid U.S. buildup; framed as soft power vs. invasion fears. X decodes as "surrender tease" or domestic calm-down.
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Reported to have had a little spirit bird he calls "pinky" on his shoulder at the time of this performance. |
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11-16-25 savo
who knows what is in the minds of all these crazi people ...but does Maduro and also his entourage look as people on the verge of being invaded, arrested and deported to the US?
I open the veni press and they all seem to be in perpetual celebration of I do not know what.
Do they know something that we do not? |
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11-16-25 spal
Recent OSINT (last 6h) clusters around psychological escalation (8.5/10 imminence): Opposition leader María Corina Machado's video urges military defections ("decisive hour imminent"), amplified on X with 200+ reposts; Rep. Gimenez signals "freedom reunions." Maduro counters with "peace" pleas, but rumors of his flight swirl.
Tangible off-ramp: Rejected oil deal (300B barrels access for sanctions relief) lingers as leverage—Trump's "stick" (Tomahawk-ready assets 150nm offshore) pushes better terms, per NYT leaks. Polymarket odds: 25% strikes by Nov 20, 42% deal by Dec 31. No kinetics yet; P-8A surveillance holds. Watch Nov 18 Trump address for pivot—coercion likely over invasion.
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11-16-25 spal
Rep. Gimenez (R-FL, Homeland Security) posted poetic Spanish verse at 7:49 PM CST: "pronto nos reencontraremos... en libertad" (soon we'll reunite... in freedom), tagging Machado/Bolívar icons—interpreted as regime-change nod amid his prior false-flag warnings.
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11-16-25 spal
"Lower your weapons, do not attack the people, make the decision today to stand with Venezuela’s freedom when the precise hour arrives. The worst hostages are those who are forced to carry out this barbarity... The position each one of you takes will mark your life forever. History, the law, and the Venezuelan people will be your judges!"
This has been interpreted by OSINT observers as a coded signal of coordinated opposition action, potentially synced with U.S. pressure, evoking pre-invasion rhetoric from past regime changes (e.g., Iraq 2003).
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11-16-25 spal
| María Corina Machado has left Venezuela |
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11-16-25 spal
| decisive hour is imminent. |
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11-16-25 spal
Viva Venezuela!
A more than three-minute-long message published earlier today by Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado, calling for supporters of President Nicolás Maduro to lay down their arms and join the fight for a free Venezuela.
“Make today the decision to accompany the freedom of Venezuela when the time comes. What is going to happen is already happening. That decisive hour is imminent.”
https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1989870906550993164?s=20 |
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11-16-25 spal
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11-16-25 savo
30% YTD drop to $200-270
i think looking this on a YTD basis understates the gravity of the problem. MSTR touched 434 on July 11 this year...and is now at 200.
that is a 54% drop.
YTD has no relevance in my opinion because early Trump's presidency there was a crypto hype following the new legislation passed... the ETFs... US Crypto capital of the world.. various Trump family members Crypto ventures... JD Vance Bitcoin strategic reserve.. etc...
But passed the hype the king is naked and things are going again in the direction they were already going before Trump. |
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