Discussion Board (Corporates)
 Board
Write new posting
Read old postings (archive)
Read your postings
Last 50 Postings | Last 100 Postings
11-09-25 carib
|
11-09-25 carib
| Would a sene person type like that? |
|
11-09-25 savo
victor ... I do not know
the world is a mess right now... and it is run by fools.
It all started with 9/11... and the initiator was Cheney.
I wonder if people that are so bad go to hell or even the devil is afraid of them! |
|
11-09-25 victor
| How easy should VOTER I.D. (IDENTIFICATION!) be to get from the Radical Left Democrats??? There should be nothing easier, right??? Well, out of 47 Dems, we don’t have even ONE VOTE from them. That is for one reason, and one reason only — THEY WANT TO CHEAT!!! THEY ARE A BUNCH OF SCOUNDRELS, CHEATERS, & PSYCHOPATHS. TERMINATE THE FILIBUSTER AND TAKE OUR COUNTRY BACK. APPROVE VOTER I.D. MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!!! |
|
11-09-25 victor
savo, we'll see what amy coney thinks.
she seems to be the deciding vote. :-)
|
|
11-09-25 savo
victor...
DT is incapable of understanding that tariffs are paid by the american consumer... not by the foreign exporter.
The Supreme Court is therefore protecting the american consumer.
Business are not pouring in... quite the opposite that is why consumer confidence index is at its lowest ever (except covid).
"The University of Michigan’s consumer sentiment index fell to 50.3 in November, down from 53.6 in October and below expectations of 53.2, a preliminary estimate showed. The reading marked the second-lowest on record, just above the June 2022 low, as Americans grew increasingly concerned about the potential economic fallout from the longest US government shutdown in history." |
|
11-09-25 pillz
"The military force in the Caribbean is too big and too powerful to be just counter-narcotics": James Story, former U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela
Sat Nov 08 09:05:17 2025 EDT
US President Donald Trump stated on several occasions during his first term (2017-2021) that all options were on the table regarding Venezuela.
Today, all those options are close to the Venezuelan coast, according to James Story, former ambassador of the Venezuela Affairs Unit, attached to the US Embassy in Bogota from 2020 to 2023.
For the past two months, the U.S. has built up in the Caribbean, near the Venezuelan coast, a military force of warships, fighter planes, bombers, marines, drones and spy planes.
According to a study by experts from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the naval deployment in the Caribbean is already the largest in the history of the United States since the first Persian Gulf War (1990-1991).
At least 64 people have been killed since September in a series of US strikes against suspected drug trafficking vessels in the Caribbean (the majority) and the eastern Pacific.
Trump claims the strikes are necessary to stem the flow of drugs to the United States, but Maduro accuses Washington of "fabricating a new war."
Nicolás Maduro accused the US of fabricating a case against his country and assured that he is preparing brigades to react to any threat from Washington.
And Tarek William Saab, Venezuela's attorney general, told the BBC that there is no doubt that Donald Trump is trying to overthrow his government.
Former ambassador James Story suggests that Trump could soon order strikes against drug trafficking facilities inside Venezuela or even give the green light for a direct attack against the top of the country's government, which he accuses of leading the Cartel of the Suns.
Story previously served as chargé d'affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Caracas from 2018 until the suspension of operations and withdrawal of U.S. diplomatic personnel from Venezuela a year later after the White House recognized opposition leader Juan Guaidó as Venezuela's president-in-charge.
After not participating in the 2018 presidential elections for not considering them as fair, the Venezuelan opposition, together with the United States and dozens of countries in Latin America and Europe, rejected the legitimacy of Maduro's victory in that contest.
In an interview with BBC Mundo, more than five years after his departure from Caracas and during what is perhaps one of the most tense moments in the history of the US-Venezuela relationship, James Story talks about the large military force that President Trump has placed near the Venezuelan coast and claims he will do "something," but very few know for sure what it is.
How do you define the relationship between Washington and Caracas today?
Right now there is no relationship between Washington and Caracas.
There is little likelihood that there will be a dialogue in any form or at least an effective dialogue.
Our policy has been to put tools in the region to do something in Venezuela.
That something has yet to be defined.
In his first term, Trump bet on political pressure and sanctions against the Maduro government. In this second term he is sending military ships to the Caribbean and has said that Maduro's days as president of Venezuela are numbered. Why such a radical change in strategy?
There are several reasons why we are seeing maximum pressure.
The first is that last year, in the election, the vast majority of Venezuelans voted for a change of government. They voted for Edmundo Gonzalez and they voted to get rid of the Maduro nightmare.
The second thing is that the migration of almost 9 million people has been quite difficult for the region.
If we talk about Aruba, 10 to 15% of the population are Venezuelans. In Colombia there are already 3 million Venezuelans.
Colombia is a country that is coming out of a civil war and now has to deal with more than 3 million people, to whom it has to provide food, housing, health and education. It is very difficult.
There are also problems with so much immigration from Central America and Mexico to the United States.
So it is a question of democracy, immigration, but also human rights, what Maduro has done against human rights and regional stability.
The Venezuelan government says the U.S. is preparing an invasion, do you think that is a possibility, and is Trump willing to put the lives of U.S. soldiers at risk to push for a change of government in Venezuela?
The force that exists is not sufficient for an invasion.
In 1983, in (the invasion of) Grenada there were 7,000. In Panama, in 1989, there were 30,000 soldiers. This time there are between 5,000 and 10,000 soldiers in the region and that is not enough for an invasion.
But the president has the ability with the tools that are in the area to do many things.
President Trump can attack more drug traffickers in the area, inside or outside Venezuela, or take down the top of the Venezuelan government.
These are decisions that I don't know if they have been made or not, but the truth is that we have a very powerful force in the region.
The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford is also about to arrive from Croatia and will give us even more power in the region.
I imagine the president is going to use that force to do something. I don't know what it is, but something he's going to do.
Do you have any ideas of what that something might be?
He might attack some clandestine airstrip south of Lake Maracaibo, where 25% of the drug flights leave.
About 5% to 10% of the cocaine that goes to the north leaves Venezuela, but of all the drug flights, 95% leave from south of Lake Maracaibo.
It could be something specific like that. It could also be a target of the Aragua Train or the Cartel of the Suns or it could be broader.
What is your opinion on the use of lethal force to attack vessels allegedly carrying drugs to the United States?
It is an issue that should be discussed by the US Congress.
We have the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) and I think Congress is about to discuss those issues: whether these groups pose a direct risk to the United States and whether we can define terrorist groups and drug trafficking groups in the same way.
We have already seen that a number of Senators, such as Rand Paul of Kentucky, disagree with the use of force in this way.
Right now, Congress is not in session. I imagine that once they come back they are going to start a discussion about it.
Do you think this fight is really against the cartels or is it against Maduro?
The force in the Caribbean is too big and too powerful to be just against narcotics.
It's a panga (small boat) against an aircraft carrier.
I would say it's a signal. The president has talked about CIA programs, for example. Something that is usually very secretive, he has talked about it in an open way.
Trump is signaling that he has all the tools of the U.S. state to use against Maduro, if necessary.
Maduro is a dictator. He is part of a criminal group that looks like a government, but is a criminal group.
He is a man who has problems with justice for drug trafficking in the United States and also for crimes against humanity in the International Criminal Court.
He is a man who is already very isolated. The leader of the opposition in Venezuela (Maria Corina Machado) won the Nobel Peace Prize. Nobody believes that he won the elections last year. Besides, he is involved in any kind of crimes.
There are those who think that if Maduro and his circle are overthrown there will be chaos and Venezuela will become Iraq, what is your vision?
I don't think so. There are some who say it will become Iraq, others say Vietnam, Libya and Haiti. None of that is true.
Venezuela is a country of patriotic people. Both María Corina Machado and Maduro believe that the Essequibo, which is in Guyana, is part of Venezuela.
Venezuelans share values, a great pride in being Venezuelans and have great natural resources to rebuild their country.
The real problem is the criminality and illegality that exists in the country, especially on the border with Colombia, with the FARC and the ELN, and other groups such as the Tren de Aragua and others that are in Petare, Catia, in Caracas.
It is going to be necessary to reinstitutionalize the whole country, from the presidency to the policeman on the corner.
That is really the challenge that exists once there is a change.
Venezuela is not going to become another Iraq. There will not be a civil war. The vast majority of Venezuelans want a way out of Maduro's nightmare and they voted to get out of it.
Now we have to help them reinstitutionalize the country.
The U.S. defended the sanctions at the time as a tool for political pressure, but today there is a debate about their effectiveness and especially their humanitarian impact. To what extent have the sanctions fulfilled their objective?
I believe that sanctions have an important role and can serve as a negotiating tool.
In the case of Venezuela, after living under sanctions for a while, everyone has learned how to handle issues outside of sanctions.
In Venezuela, they started selling their oil to China through ghost ships, as we call them, washing the oil in Malaysia.
So, the effectiveness of sanctions is very short. President (Joe) Biden made the decision to use maximum pressure from President Trump to enter into negotiations.
What was the result? A primary (election) and then a (presidential) election in which Maduro made the bad decision to (let) the democratic forces participate and win in a very obvious and big way.
More than 70% of the population voted against Maduro.
Now, in Trump's second term, the decision was made to increase the pressure even more.
In his first term, Trump said that all options were on the table. Now we can see that those options are on the coast.
Do you think it was a good decision to partially lift sanctions? Critics say this decision has given a lifeline to the Maduro government.
When the Biden administration made the decision to let Chevron operate and market oil (in Venezuela) the result was very interesting.
Tareck El Aissami, the head of PDVSA and the oil minister, was selling oil on the black market for years.
Then, with Chevron's license, he was selling this oil to the United States in a very transparent way.
Then Maduro realized that El Aissami was stealing a lot of money from the State and this man who was part of a small group of Maduro's government cartel disappeared.
The truth is that the regime always gets what it wants in any way. It can be by drug trafficking or by selling gold or oil to third parties in the black market.
It was not a lifting of sanctions, but a specific license to Chevron and then to Repsol and Eni so they could pay their debt to Venezuela through oil.
In this new Trump administration, he also granted a license to Chevron to do the same.
When you were in Caracas, the United States was the first country to recognize Juan Guaidó as interim president of Venezuela. Was that a wise move?
I believe that recognizing Juan Guaidó was the right thing to do at the time. According to the Venezuelan Constitution, when there is no president, the president of the National Assembly occupies the role of interim president of the Republic.
In 2018 an election stolen by Maduro left the presidency in Miraflores (Venezuela's government palace) empty and Juan Guaidó took the position of interim president.
Almost 60 countries in the world also made the decision to recognize Juan Guaidó and not recognize Maduro.
To this day we do not recognize Maduro as head of state.
What mistakes do you recognize in U.S. policy towards Venezuela during your years in Caracas?
I wanted to stay in Venezuela for sure. I think it's important to keep the U.S. flag there, a giant flag that you see on top of a hill in the Caracas valley. It's a symbol of freedom that everyone can see.
So leaving Venezuela was a mistake because it affected our ability to get more intelligence, to talk to people on the ground and also to support Americans imprisoned in Venezuela.
It was a mistake to leave, but it was understandable why we did it.
Do you think that at this moment political change in Venezuela depends more on external than internal factors?
I believe it depends on both. Political change in Venezuela depends on those who know that life would be better without Maduro and on the pressure that the world and the international community can put.
What is important for those who are going to act inside Venezuela is that they know what their future would look like if they act against Maduro.
OK, he left, but me as a general, where do I stay?
I stay in my job, or I have to leave or they are going to put me in jail. That's the question that I imagine many people around Maduro have in their heads.
Do you see the return of a U.S. embassy in Caracas in the short or medium term? What would have to happen for that to happen?
Well, the first thing to reopen an embassy in Venezuela would be to have the necessary security to have it and an invitation from the government.
With a change of regime I imagine we could reopen the embassy.
We already have the embassy facilities there in Caracas.
A lot of work needs to be done to bring it up to date because it has been about six years without being there and security for our people is extremely important.
With a regime change in Venezuela we could have a presence there in a very short time.
"Maduro needs to understand that he has been offered a negotiation process and that, if he accepts it, he will do much better. But he will leave, whatever he decides": interview with María Corina Machado, Nobel Peace Prize winner.
How far can Trump go to help María Corina Machado after the Nobel Peace Prize to the Venezuelan opponent?
Trinidad and Tobago, the country defending Trump's anti-drug operation in the Caribbean (and how this strains relations with neighboring Venezuela)
SID(FNWfee09ed37ab770fac02f)
CHV-BUL CHV-FRA CHVX34-BSP CVX CVX-BQ CVX-BUE CVX-CO CVX-SGO CVX-SWX CVX.SGO-FVIS CVX.SWX-FVIS CVXCL-SGO CVX_USD-SWX
caras dvpcoz gcat gdip gpir gpol i1 ifosfl iioil ioilgas lamz namz samz usa ven xf500
Provided by INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE INC
**M2Z-PR-ESCS-13 |
|
11-09-25 pillz
Environmental analysis | International encirclement and chavismo's options: signs of an inevitable end
Sun Nov 09 07:23:09 2025 EDT
We must always keep in mind that it has been Chavismo, through its infamous actions during its 26 years in power, that has brought us to this situation, and that they could quickly put an end to it by surrendering to justice. Because, just as they brought us here, they could also avoid a damage that the noble and brave people of Venezuela do not have to suffer. Because it is not a matter of defending the homeland but of defending them, who do not deserve it.
The update in the light of the new events points to a context of maximum military tension around Venezuela, without recent historical precedents. The United States and allies have deployed a massive naval and air force in the Caribbean, including the super aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, advancing their presence as an explicit response to the alliance of Chavismo with transnational actors of organized crime and drug trafficking, the unlikely but possible involvement of Russia, and the stagnation of institutional solutions. ?
The probability that Chavismo will remain is reflected in what we call the Innocuous Political Stagnation scenario, which is the one currently being experienced, based on the relative strength of internal controls over the armed forces, the intelligence apparatus and the paramilitary collectives, as well as political support from Russia, China and Iran; but also in the media space that the US is leaving open, by extending the psychological phase of this hybrid war, to a point where it stops generating terror and becomes a boomerang that makes them lose seriousness and credibility... as it has happened so many times in the past... as has happened so many times in the past.
However, any forceful fact that shows that they are going "from words to deeds", could force an accelerated collapse under the scenario of fracture or partial surrender of military commands. However, so far, Maduro has refused to negotiate a voluntary exit, and is betting on resistance and external support, be it from the US Democrats, Lula's Brazil or some kind of contribution in military equipment from Russia... Because China has already disengaged itself from the issue, and Iran was militarily hit hard after the combined attacks by Israel and the US.
The unprecedented grouping of troops, aircraft carriers, fighters, advanced technology and intelligence (including authorized covert operations) responds to the formal recognition of Chavismo as a transnational criminal structure and the frustration of previous attempts at political pressure. The US has made it clear that the immediate objective is to "block" the Cartel of the Suns and isolate Maduro militarily, also cutting off the flow of oil to Cuba and restricting international logistical support. ?
The siege is the biggest seen so far, and the deployment and pressure to precipitate a change is extremely high; which should lead to the inexorable capture of Maduro and his accomplices. Those who, in addition to facing multimillion rewards and being public about the CIA intelligence missions, seek to impact from the outside a change of behavior in the FANB, possible mutinies and some unforeseen margin that could open up, and avoid the need to militarily force the exit. This could minimize the amount and depth of collateral damage, which, although undesirable, is known to be typical of this type of actions.
The size and logistics of the deployment confirm that it is not a one-off or purely deterrent act. There are bases that are being reactivated and exercises that anticipate a months-long operation, or even a long-term stabilization operation if the transition gets complicated or derives into a regional conflict, such as confronting Colombia, which under the "Petro effect" may extend the conflict beyond the Venezuelan border. Experts foresee a sustained campaign of combined pressure (military, intelligence, sanctions and support to like-minded forces in Venezuela). ?
As for the bases being reactivated, yes, there is concrete and verifiable evidence that tangibly demonstrates the permanent rehabilitation of the former military base in Puerto Rico, known as Roosevelt Roads, which is already operational and expanding for sustained military use and not for temporary use. Therefore, the concrete sign is the visible changes in the infrastructure, confirmed by public satellite images and reports from experts and specialized international media.
In addition, several sources agree that these improvements could turn the base back into a permanent strategic point for U.S. operations in the Caribbean, reinforcing the geopolitical pressure on Venezuela. ?
Achieving the departure of the Chavista leadership is a necessary but insufficient condition: stabilization requires institutional reconstruction, control of insurgent pockets, citizen confidence and international integration. The US and its partners seem to be preparing to support this process beyond a simple decapitation of the cartel, aiming at avoiding power vacuums and scenarios of civil war or anarchy. It should be noted that the Sinaloa cartel continues to operate despite the fact that Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán is imprisoned in the US... draw your own conclusions.
The situation evolves daily, but the message is clear: external pressure will be unprecedented, but only an orderly and internationally supported transition will be able to guarantee a stabilized and reconstruction-oriented Venezuela.
Now, reviewing the scenarios that we follow week by week, we must recognize that the panorama, far from clearing, has entered a phase of high tension and multidimensional complexity. Trump's meetings with Lula and Xi (leaders of Brazil and China, respectively) have incorporated information, making the Venezuelan crisis a geopolitical problem with global actors.
The main update is the mutation of the Pessimistic Scenario and the confirmation of the Harmless Scenario as a pre-conflict armed truce.
1. Optimistic Scenario: Democratic Transition (Probability: Less than 10%) 2.
Update: The probability of a peaceful transition has become almost nil. Chavismo's position, entrenched and refusing even to discuss a dignified exit or exile, demonstrates that it only contemplates surrender under extreme coercion
Reconfiguration: Trump's meetings with Lula and Xi have consolidated the position that there will be no international mediation for a "golden exile". Washington's position, supported by Beijing's practical neutrality (prioritizing its assets) and Lula's diplomacy (seeking to avoid a regional conflict), suggests that the only "pact" is the surrender of the top leadership to U.S. or international justice. The only optimistic shortcut is an immediate surrender after the first significant military attack (a bombing or surgical raid), something that Chavismo has shown no willingness to do.
2. Harmless Scenario: Political Stalemate (Current) (Probability: 70% - Active).
Update: This scenario remains in effect, but its nature has changed: it is no longer just inaction, but a tactical military truce. Chavismo remains in power thanks to the US inhibition to escalate above the threshold of maritime interdiction.
The Reading (The Deception): As long as the bulk of the US offensive is limited to the communicational, diplomatic, judicial (arrest warrants) and demonstrative naval deployment (such as the unfired aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford), Chavismo will continue in this scenario. The military silence of the Task Force is not inaction, but intelligence gathering and readjustment of plans due to the "Petro effect". The question remains: how much longer will the US allow this status quo to persist? The answer is: just long enough for intelligence to determine that a surgical strike will be clean and effective.
3. Pessimistic Scenario: Conflict or Intervention (Probability: Dramatic Increase, 90% Short-Term)
Key Update (Trump-Xi-Lula Effect): Trump's meeting with Xi (China) has confirmed that Beijing will not intervene militarily to save the leadership. The green light to a conflict is based on the understanding that China will prioritize its assets (debt and oil) over saving an inefficient and corrupt regime. China's tacit non-objection eliminates the biggest geopolitical risk to the US.
The Mutation of the Conflict: What was once a small incursion is now an expanded regional threat. The "Petro effect" (the de facto alliance of Colombian-Venezuelan forces on the border with guerrilla support) forces the US to:
Elevate the scale: The presence of the Gerald R. Ford is no longer a mere threat, but an asset for a deep and long duration operation that may include strategic bombing and air support to ground incursions
Redefine the Objective: The primary focus becomes narcoterrorism in the Colombian-Venezuelan region. The change of government in Caracas becomes an ancillary and necessary outcome to dismantle the criminal structure of the Cartel of the Suns and its allies.
The two key themes that emerge from this analysis are a) that the political cost of the US not acting is now greater than the cost of acting, and that the Pessimistic scenario is the most logical and foreseeable route for the resolution of this crisis; where the end of impunity will be the first objective, and the change of government the second. And b) that the sub-product of cutting off the oil supply to Cuba, paves the way for the "ripe fruit" effect to make Cuba surrender without resistance -and even willingly- to the end of this campaign that starts with Venezuela, continues with Colombia, and reaches Mexico, all of them supporters of the continuity of the system that has been ruling Cuba for years... Ah... and we must not forget Spain, which for many years now, through its investments in tourism, has also been the great financial support of the island.
Recommendations
To the Chavista government: The only possible assertive recommendation, at this moment, is the minimization of damages and the immediate cessation of the escalation and hostilities against the Venezuelan people. Armed resistance or final obstruction will not change the outcome, they will only aggravate the judicial and personal consequences for the entire leadership and middle management. Their only reasonable path is to facilitate a quick and controlled handover of critical assets (Electric Complex, PDVSA, Reserves) to the transition team, negotiating a framework of personal and family security guarantees in exchange for avoiding conflict. There is no golden exile, but there is a way to avoid total chaos.
For the elected government (led by Machado and Gonzalez): The priority must be the management of citizen expectations to avoid pre-transition chaos. The leadership of calm, because 90% of the population is in a phase of extreme anxiety, with a central message of: "Victory is assured, waiting is the strategy, peace is the prize". The elected government must communicate a transparent and weekly transition schedule, emphasizing that every day of non-conflict is a day of moral victory and a day of saving infrastructure and lives. Impatience must be transformed into strategic patience, ensuring that action is in the hands of the professionals. Calm is the most valuable strategic asset in this phase!
For honest and hard-working entrepreneurs (I will not waste any more time with the leadership co-opted by chavismo): In the face of stagnation, inflation and devaluation (Bs. 357.67 / $$$1), the strategy is the protection of operating capital and preparation for competition. I propose a plan of shielding and mapping that I call "of the 72 Hours": Do not invest fixed capital; protect the working capital and act with a three-day vision. Focus on converting income immediately to hard assets (dollars or core inventory). In parallel, activate "Rebuilding Mapping": identify immediate risk capital investment niches (infrastructure, technology, logistics) and prepare your plans to align with international compliance. Rebuilding will be massive and fast; whoever is ready and legally clean will win the first and most profitable wave of investment. Today's survival is tomorrow's leadership!
Contact
Mail: [email protected]
SID(FNW9566ecc3424a61e32ea9)
asiaz dvpcoz eeurz eurz gcat gcrim gorgnz gtraff lamz namz russ samz usa ven
Provided by INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE INC
**M2Z-PR-ESCS-13 |
|
11-09-25 pillz
U.S. pressure revives expectations of political change and Venezuelan bonds back on investor radar
Sun Nov 09 08:53:02 2025 EDT
The US military deployment in the Caribbean and the increasing pressure of Donald Trump' s administration on Nicolás Maduro have reactivated the expectation of a political turnaround in Venezuela that would allow the country's return to the international financial market. In this new environment, investors, after years of indifference, are once again looking at Venezuelan bonds, betting on a transition that would enable the restructuring of the debt, in default since 2017.
The price of the Venezuelan debt bond maturing in 2027, one of the most traded, has increased 37% since the close of July and in general all securities, including those issued by Pdvsa, the state-owned oil company, show a similar rise.
Stock brokers agree that investors are betting that the United States will trigger a process to remove Maduro from power. The deployment of airplanes, ships and aircraft carriers in the Caribbean, added to the accusations linking the president to drug trafficking networks, reinforces this expectation. In addition, the Trump administration considers him illegitimate after a reelection marked by allegations of electoral fraud.
Venezuela has defaulted on its foreign debt for eight years and, in the event of a political change, the restructuring of liabilities would become one of the priorities of the new government. On bonds alone, issued both by the State and by public companies such as PDVSA, the country is in arrears of US$ 2.22 billion in principal and interest.
Venezuela's vast oil reserves and its capacity to increase production under a legitimate government, free of sanctions and capable of attracting foreign investment in relevant amounts, top the list of reasons why investors are betting on a sustained recovery of bond prices in the event of a political change.
There are less optimistic views. In a report analyzing the scenario in the event of Maduro's departure, UBS warns that Venezuela would face one of the most complex debt restructurings in modern history, comparable to that of Iraq in 2003.
The total amount, around US$160 billion, the diversity of creditors, geopolitical factors -such as the role of China and Russia- and the possibility of part of the debt being considered "odious", make up a highly complex legal and financial scenario.
The firm explains that investors face significant opportunity costs. With U.S. Treasuries yielding between 3.5% and 4.5%, and a diversified basket of dollar-denominated government debt offering returns of 5% to 6%, waiting for a political and financial resolution in Venezuela may not make sense.
"We view the recent rally in Venezuelan bond prices as an opportunity to reduce exposure, rather than add risk," UBS advises clients.
Venezuela in the spotlight
During the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in Washington, Barclays organized a private meeting with María Corina Machado, a leading Venezuelan opposition figure, to discuss investment opportunities in the event of an eventual political transition.
Machado supports Edmundo González, who assumed the presidential candidacy after his disqualification. According to the minutes compiled by the opposition, Gonzalez obtained a clear victory in the elections, although the results have not been officially recognized by the regime.
As revealed, the event organized by Barclays was widely attended by investment firms, hedge funds and financial players interested in Venezuela's return to the international economic circuit. Machado has formed a technical team that has already prepared a plan to start the institutional and economic reconstruction of the country if the political change takes place.
Last Wednesday, during the America Business Forum held in Miami, the Venezuelan leader stated: "We are going to turn Venezuela into the energy and technology center of the Americas. Venezuela will be the new global frontier of innovation and wealth creation. And we invite you to be part of this".
From collapse to take-off
The proposal that Machado's technical team has presented to potential investors contemplates measures to stabilize the economy and boost growth through an ambitious investment program that, over a 15-year horizon, could triple the size of GDP. Venezuela, which historically ranked among the top five economies in Latin America, now has one of the lowest per capita incomes in the region, comparable to that of Honduras.
In the short term, the plan contemplates an "expansionary stabilization" strategy aimed at containing the exchange rate, slowing inflation and, at the same time, reactivating economic growth with the support of multilateral agencies.
A recognized government would be able to negotiate loans with the IMF, the World Bank, the IDB and the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF). According to preliminary calculations based on Venezuela's quota in these organizations, it would be possible to structure a financing program that would provide around US$60 billion over a period of five to ten years.
Part of the resources coming from the multilateral organizations would enter the international reserves, currently at historic lows, which would allow the Central Bank to stabilize the exchange market and guarantee the supply of foreign currency. The plan also contemplates eliminating monetary financing of the deficit, with the objective of decelerating inflation in the short term.
At the same time, the social emergency will be addressed through direct transfers to the population in extreme poverty and a program to recover schools and hospitals, which would include improvements in infrastructure, provision of medicines and outpatient operations with the support of private clinics. These measures, together with the restoration of essential public services such as electricity and water supply, would have a positive impact on growth.
In the medium and long term, the reconstruction project contemplates attracting private investment, both domestic and foreign, in twelve strategic areas: oil, gas, metals, energy, health, education, transportation, finance, real estate, technology, tourism and agriculture, in order to boost the economy's growth in a sustained manner.
Oil opening
While the plan contemplates multiple areas, it is clear that the main springboard for recovery would be oil. According to OPEC secondary sources, Venezuela produced 895,000 barrels per day in October, less than a third of when Chavismo came to power in 1998.
The reconstruction plan contemplates opening the oil sector to national and international private capital through legal reforms that make investment attractive in order to take advantage of the country's potential. UBS highlights in its report that multinationals "would rush to participate to help improve oil production."
"This is due to the country's low investment requirements - oil costs only $20 to $30 per barrel to extract - and Venezuela's advantageous geographic location for exporting to U.S. Gulf Coast refineries and European customers," it adds.
UBS estimates that, in a conservative scenario, adding an additional one million barrels per day would take between five and ten years, while recovering the three million barrels per day production level the country reached in 1998 could take about 15 years.
"This would be positive for the world's oil supply, the profitability of certain oil companies and the energy security of the American continent. However, we should be clear that this would take a long time to materialize and faces enormous execution risks," the UBS report adds.
SID(FNWe90efd7b1dc65282a589)
caribz dvpcoz e21 e212 ecat gcat gpir gpol lamz namz samz usa ven
Provided by INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE INC
**M2Z-PR-ESCS-13 |
|
11-09-25 victor
:-))
So, let’s get this straight??? The President of the United States is allowed (and fully approved by Congress!) to stop ALL TRADE with a Foreign Country (Which is far more onerous than a Tariff!), and LICENSE a Foreign Country, but is not allowed to put a simple Tariff on a Foreign Country, even for purposes of NATIONAL SECURITY. That is NOT what our great Founders had in mind! The whole thing is ridiculous! Other Countries can Tariff us, but we can’t Tariff them??? It is their DREAM!!! Businesses are pouring into the USA ONLY BECAUSE OF TARIFFS. HAS THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT NOT BEEN TOLD THIS??? WHAT THE HELL IS GOING ON???President DJT |
|
11-09-25 savo
JPM
The IMF Executive Board has completed the third review of Ecuador’s 48-month Extended Fund Facility (EFF), enabling an immediate disbursement of approximately US$600mn. This brings total disbursements under the program to US$2.7bn, with access to up to US$5bn through 2028 (Figure 1). The authorities have met all quantitative performance criteria for end-August 2025, many with significant margins, and have made notable progress on their structural reform agenda, particularly in fiscal management, governance, and growth-enhancing measures (Table 1).
As highlighted in our recent research, Ecuador’s economic recovery continues to outperform expectations, supported by robust domestic demand, record non-oil exports, and low inflation. The current account is projected to maintain sizable surpluses, bolstering international reserves, while the financial sector remains broadly stable and credit growth continues to underpin economic activity. While risks remain elevated and skewed to the downside, these have been mitigated by decisive program implementation. Ongoing fiscal consolidation and reform efforts have driven a compression of sovereign spreads. The government is advancing reforms to strengthen financial regulation, liberalize interest rates, develop domestic capital markets, and attract private investment, while enhancing resilience to natural disasters and illicit activities.
Fast-track (non-oil) fiscal consolidation
Ecuador’s fiscal targets have been recalibrated to accommodate the temporary impact of July’s oil output shock. The NFPS (including oil) deficit is now projected at 1.2% of GDP in 2025, a deterioration of 0.3%-pt versus the prior review, reflecting lower oil export revenues and higher fuel derivative imports. Nevertheless, the overall fiscal position is expected to improve slightly in 2025 (+0.1%-pt) year-on-year, supported by a stronger non-oil balance. Indeed, the non- oil primary balance is expected to narrow by 1.3% of GDP in 2025, driven by fuel price realignment and improved non-oil revenue performance.
To strengthen fiscal revenues, the government has implemented new fees on small parcels and the mining sector, revamped dividend taxation, realigned domestic diesel prices with international levels, and are accelerating the sale of mobile broadband concessions. These measures, alongside the VAT rate increase enacted in 2024, are expected to boost non-oil tax revenues to 14.4% of GDP in 2025 (+0.7%-pt) and 14.6% (+0.2%-pt) in 2026, offsetting the expiration of temporary revenue measures. Expenditure rationalization is also underway, including streamlining ministries and secretariats to improve efficiency and reduce bureaucracy.
Over the program period (2024–2028), the authorities continue to target a cumulative fiscal consolidation of 6.6% of GDP in the non-oil primary balance (including subsidies). Notably, 3.5%-pt of this adjustment has been front-loaded in the first two years (2024/25), with a further 1.6%-pt expected in 2026, supported by increased non-oil revenues, lower fuel subsidies, and continued reforms (Figure 2 and 3). We note that the scale of Ecuador’s fiscal consolidation is ambitious—above the 75th percentile of IMF programs—highlighting the importance of ongoing structural reforms to unlock growth potential and further rationalize expenditures to achieve medium-term fiscal targets.
Eyes on the prize
Relative to the second review, the revised financing plan anticipates higher domestic financing in 2025 to offset the oil output shock and a slightly slower pace of domestic arrears clearance, while multilateral financing is expected to remain broadly unchanged (Figure 4). Bilateral creditor support, including upcoming projects with EXIM China and commitments from other official creditors, is expected to cover debt amortizations over the next year.
Looking ahead, the authorities’ financing plan envisages a return to international capital markets in the second half of 2026, with a planned US$1 billion external bond issuance (Table 2). Finance Minister Moya has indicated preparations for a third debt-for-nature swap to further reduce the country’s risk premium, noting that bond spreads would need to narrow by an additional 300–400bps for Ecuador to tap markets by 3Q26. Amortization of the 2030 global bonds issued in 2020 will begin in 2026, with two principal payments of US$400mn due at end-January and end-July, respectively. The planned issuance would result in a modest increase in external bonded debt of US$200mn in 2026, with net bond issuance expected to rise further in 2027 and 2028 (+US$0.7bn and US$1.2bn, respectively) as market access is reestablished.
|
|
11-09-25 savo
Incidentally.... the world was not united... the US and its usual lapdogs were...but China, Russia, India and many others were not part of them.
|
|
11-09-25 savo
the odd thing is that not only Pompeo said it by the Rick Scott too:
on January 30, 2019, during an interview with Fox News, Scott said:
"Maduro’s days are numbered. The world is united in supporting the people of Venezuela and the legitimate leader of the Venezuelan National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, who has been recognized by the United States and many other countries as the interim president of Venezuela."
I can't think of worst people than this bunch of Cuban renegades plus all the clowns that follow their lead.
They produced immense damage to the people of venezuela while living the great life in Florida with other people's money. |
|
11-09-25 carib
By definition, every mortal's days "are numbered"...
|
|
11-09-25 savo
Leo.... from 2019
US Secretary of State Pompeo confident Maduro's 'days are numbered' in Venezuela amid violent impasse
Authored By Wion Web Desk
Published: Feb 25, 2019,
https://www.wionews.com/world/pompeo-confident-maduros-days-are-numbered-in-venezuela-199411
These imbeciles costed us 8 years of interest |
|
11-08-25 carib
Leo: yes, but Maduro "is a tough cookie".
Probably "hay que pasar a las malas.." |
|
11-08-25 leopardo
URGENTE - ¡LO ÚLTIMO! 🇻🇪 🇺🇸 —
Senador Rick Scott en Fox News:
“Los días de Maduro están contados, y si yo fuera él, me largaría de Venezuela hoy mismo”. |
|
11-08-25 carib
Savo: it is indeed (part of the same campaign).
what matters for us is just the outcome. |
|
11-08-25 savo
FWI .. i do not believe the news that is circulating that Maduro offered to go if granted free passage.
I think is part of the same campaign to try to turn the military against Maduro.
In the meantime it seems the US gov can not go by a day without killing somebody somewhere...now it is the daily killing of low rank operatives in the Caribbean, while the narco bosses live in Florida and contribute to the political campaigns. |
|
|
